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Assimilation, Multiculturalism, Hybridity:
The Dilemmas of the Ethnic Chinese
in Post-Suharto Indonesia1
CHANG-YAU HOON
(School of Social and Cultural Studies, University of Western Australia)
The dominant discourse in accommodating the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia during
Suharto’s regime was one of assimilation, which forcefully aimed to absorb this minority
into the national body. However, continuous oﬃcial discrimination towards the Chinese
placed them in a paradoxical position that made them an easy target of racial and class
hostility. The May 1998 anti-Chinese riots proved the failure of the assmilationist policy.
The process of democratization has given rise to a proliferation of identity politics in post-
Suharto Indonesia. The policy of multiculturalism has been endorsed by Indonesia’s
current power holders as a preferred approach to rebuilding the nation, consistent with the
national motto: ‘Unity in Diversity’. This paper critically considers the politics of
multiculturalism and its eﬃcacy in managing cultural diversity and diﬀerences. It deploys
the concept of hybridity to describe as well as analyze the complex identity politics of the
ethnic Chinese in contemporary Indonesia.
Keywords: Chinese – Indonesians, hybridity, multiculturalism, assimilation, Indonesia,
Chinese overseas
With a population of approximately 206 million and more than 1000 ethnic and sub-
ethnic groups, Indonesia is undoubtedly one of the most ethnically and culturally
diverse countries in the world. The Javanese (41.7 per cent) and Sundanese (15.41 per
cent) are two of Indonesia’s largest ethnic groups (Suryadinata et al., 2003).2 In
comparison, only about 2 – 3 per cent of the population are ethnic Chinese, making
them one of the many minority ethnic groups in Indonesia (Mackie, 2005).3 It is
1 An earlier version of this paper was published in Pass and Woods (2004).
2 I acknowledge here that I identify and enumerate ethnic ‘groups’ for convenience. ‘Group’ has been a
conventional way to identify ethnicities in Indonesia, but it is a problematic concept.
3 Indonesia’s population census of 2000 revealed that the oﬃcial percentage of ethnic Chinese was 0.86 per
cent of the entire population (Suryadinata et al., 2003, p. 7). The 2000 population census was the ﬁrst
since 1930 to attempt to calculate the ethnic composition of Indonesia’s population. Successive
governments have considered ethnicity a sensitive issue, and it was not included in the censuses conducted
in 1961, 1971, 1980 and 1990 (Suryadinata et al., 2003, pp. xx – xxi). However, Suryadinata et al.
acknowledged that the 2000 census percentage was problematic because of under-reporting of Chinese
ethnicity. The name-changing regulation of 1966 forced Chinese to change their Chinese names into
Indonesian-sounding names, along with the military-backed assimilation programme during the Suharto
era and the fear of self-identifying Chinese identity due to the traumatic events of May 1998, meant that
many Chinese identiﬁed themselves as belonging to other ethnic groups in the 2000 census (Suryadinata
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important to note that not all governments of multiethnic and multicultural nations
adopt the ideology of multiculturalism as their oﬃcial policy to accommodate ethnic and
cultural diﬀerences. Moreover, even if they do, the policy tends to be like the concept of
‘democracy’—it can mean anything. This tendency was evident in the multiethnic state
of Indonesia, before the fall of former President Suharto’s regime in 1998. The 32 years
of Suharto’s authoritarian rule, also known as the New Order, began in 1966.
Ju-lan Thung (1998, p. 23), writing just before the regime’s collapse, contended,
‘The discursive competition between assimilationism, multiculturalism and the
subjectivity of conditional belonging has not yet taken place in Indonesia. So far an
assimilationist discourse rules. The possibility of developing multiculturalism is still
remote.’ However, the downfall of Suharto not only ended the New Order’s ideology of
assimilation, it also opened up a new space for the resurgence of identity politics across
Indonesia. Consequently, the discourse of multiculturalism has been discussed and
debated increasingly among social activists and academics in post-Suharto Indonesia.4
This paper begins with discussion of the position of the ethnic Chinese within the
framework of Indonesia’s national ideology under Suharto’s New Order. It then
critically examines the eﬃcacy of multiculturalism as a government policy in managing
cultural diversity and diﬀerence, especially in accommodating ‘Chineseness’ in post-
Suharto Indonesia. The ﬁnal section explores the idea of hybridity, encompassing
syncretism and the complexities of cultural crossings, borrowing and mixing. The
concept of hybridity is used here as a scholarly approach—or ‘heuristic device’ (Ang,
2001a, p. 17) or ‘methodological concept’ (Papastergiadis, 2005, p. 56)—to describe and
analyze the complex identity politics of the ethnic Chinese in contemporary Indonesia.
I do not intend to posit multiculturalism and hybridity in binary opposition, nor to
suggest hybridity as a replacement for multiculturalism in government policy. On the
contrary, I endeavour to highlight the importance for multiculturalism to recognize the
blurring of cultural boundaries that takes place through hybridity in the everyday
reality of an ethnically diverse society.
Assimilationism under Suharto’s New Order
In shaping Indonesia’s national policies during the New Order (1966 – 1998), President
Suharto created a new ‘culture’ by reaﬃrming the importance of the ideology of
Pancasila. Pancasila consists of ﬁve principles: the belief in one supreme God, huma-
nism, nationalism, popular sovereignty and social justice. This national ideology was
promoted as the single basic principle for all ‘mass organizations’ and ‘social-political
forces’ under the Suharto regime (Morﬁt, 1986, p. 42). Pancasila was implemented to
et al., pp. 74 – 5). Hence the 0.86 per cent is deﬁnitely an underestimation. After using various methods,
Suryadinata et al. estimated that the ethnic Chinese comprised about 1.4 per cent of the population
(p. 101). However, according to Mackie (2005), this percentage still seems ‘far too low to be credible’.
Mackie’s article suggests that it is more realistic to assume the percentage of Chinese in Indonesia to be
2 – 3 per cent, even though this ﬁgure may not be much more than ‘well-informed guesses’ (p. 101).
4 For instance, Jurnal Antropologi Indonesia (published by the Department of Anthropology in the
University of Indonesia) organized its third international symposium in July 2002 in Bali with the theme,
‘Rebuilding Indonesia, a Nation of ‘‘Unity in Diversity’’: Towards a Multicultural Society’. It also
organized the workshop ‘Multicultural Education in Southeast Asian Nations: Sharing Experiences’ in
Depok in 2003. Danusiri and Alhaziri (2002) present a collection of essays on multicultural education. The
policy of multiculturalism in Indonesia is mainly advocated by the newly developed civil society, prompted
by the post-Suharto process of democratization. For details, see Burhanuddin (2003) especially Section 3,
‘Multikulturalisme dan Penguatan ‘‘Civil Society’’’ (Multiculturalism and the strengthening of civil society).
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permeate ‘every facet of the life of our [Indonesian] nation and the state’ (Suharto cited
in Elson, 2001, p. 241). The New Order’s interpretation of Pancasila was part of an
attempt to achieve the primary goal of assuring political stability and security necessary
for national development. Hence, to ‘deviate from Pancasila is to undermine
development eﬀorts, national stability and the character of the Indonesian people’
(Morﬁt, 1986, p. 43).
In addition, the plurality and pluralism fostered during Sukarno’s ‘Old Order’ were
deemed by the New Order to threaten the nation’s development and security, and so
were suppressed through the introduction of SARA in the 1970s (Thung, 2004, p. 219).
SARA is an acronym that summarizes the sensitive issues of ethnicity (suku), religion
(agama), race (ras) and interclass (antar golongan) diﬀerences. Under the banner of
maintaining order and stability, all public discussions of issues related to SARA were
prohibited. It can be said that, during the New Order, Indonesian citizens irrespective
of their ethnicity, religion, class and gender were all imagined within a constructed
homogeneous Pancasila national identity. The internally diverse identities were often
subsumed and overridden by this imagined and constructed national homogeneity (see
Rosaldo, 2003).
However, the New Order’s national ideology never managed successfully to
accommodate the presence of its ethnic minorities, including the Chinese, in its
construction of what Benedict Anderson (1983) describes as a national imagined
community. As Ien Ang (2001b, p. 28) states, ‘while the Indonesian nation was from its
inception imagined as a multiethnic entity, the place of those marked as ‘‘Chinese’’ in
this ‘‘unity-in-diversity’’ has always been resolutely ambiguous and uncertain’. In the
course of nation building, Indonesia has found it impossible to construct its national
identity without identifying ‘signiﬁcant others’.5 According to Anthony Reid,
‘Chineseness became one of the most important ‘‘Others’’ against which the new
national identities deﬁned themselves’ (cited in Lloyd, 2001, p. 3). While, for most
nations, citizenship connotes a legal status that diﬀerentiates a citizen from a foreigner,
in postcolonial states such as Indonesia, it was internally contestable. Rosaldo’s (2003,
p. 2) concept of ‘cultural citizenship’ eloquently captures the power inequalities that are
‘at play in relation to mechanisms of marginalization and exclusion’, among diﬀerent
citizen ‘groups’ in a single nation. Ironically in the context of Indonesia, as Charles
Coppel (1983, p. 3) observes, the term ‘Indonesian citizen’ (Warga Negara Indonesia,
WNI) is artiﬁcial and non-realistic: if in everyday speech someone is referred to as a
WNI, it is commonly understood to mean that s/he is of foreign (especially Chinese)
origin and not indigenous (asli). WNI is thus understood to be an abbreviation of WNI
keturunan asing (Indonesian citizen of foreign descent). The use of the word asing
(foreign) underlines the alien-ness of Chinese-Indonesians in Indonesian asli eyes.
In Suharto’s Indonesia (and to some extent even now), ‘national identity’ required
more than proof of birth in the country. Among citizens, there were oﬃcial categories
of pribumi (native) and non-pribumi (non-native)—based on ‘race’ and indigeneity—
with the former being regarded as the ‘authentic’ (asli) inhabitants of the land.6
5 Stuart Hall contends, ‘The notion of the sociological subject reﬂected the growing complexity of the
modern world and the awareness that this inner core of the subject was not autonomous and self-
suﬃcient, but was formed in relation to ‘‘signiﬁcant others’’, who mediated to the subject the values,
meanings and symbols—the culture—of the worlds he/she inhabited’ (Hall, 1992, p. 277).
6 The oﬃcial labelling of the Indonesian population according to the ‘racial’ division of ‘pribumi’ and ‘non-
pribumi’ was abolished only in 1998 by President Habibie.
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The term ‘pribumi’ was as much an artiﬁcial national construct as the term ‘non-
pribumi’. As there are about 300 diﬀerent ethnic ‘groups’ that are considered as ‘native’
in Indonesia, it can be argued that there is no single pribumi identity. In Kalimantan,
for instance, the Dayaks see themselves as more native (pribumi) than the Madurese
who migrated there later. However, the New Order government ignored this internal
diversity within the pribumi ethnicities when constructing the ethnic Other—the Chinese
non-pribumi. Since Indonesianness is deﬁned in terms of indigeneity or pribumi-ness, ‘no
one can become [‘‘true’’] Indonesian without ﬁrst becoming a member of a pribumi
ethnic group’ (Suparlan, 2003, p. 26). Hence, the Chinese who had acquired Indonesian
citizenship were still seen as ‘foreigners’ and categorized as non-pribumi, as they were
perceived to have originated from a land ‘outside’ the boundaries of the Indonesian
nation (Aguilar Jr, 2001). This racial dichotomy of pribumi and non-pribumi was rigidly
maintained during the New Order, with the intent continuously to objectify and
essentialize the Chinese as the foreign ‘Other’ and prevent them from being accepted
fully as ‘Indonesians’.
Yet, ironically, ‘Chineseness’ was also widely perceived as a ‘domestic’ problem
(known as the ‘Chinese problem’ or ‘Masalah Cina’) which was detrimental to the
nation’s solidarity. Viewing the dominant position of the Chinese in the nation’s
economy as a problem, the New Order government attempted to solve it by endorsing a
military-backed ‘Assimilation Program’ (‘Program Pembauran’). This programme
prescribed the total dissolution of any markers and identiﬁers of ‘Chineseness’, and
urged this problematic ethnic group to immerse itself in oﬃcially constructed local
cultures. These constructed local cultures, as Ariel Heryanto (1998, p. 103) claims, were
‘the only legitimate ethnic cultures’ in Suharto’s Indonesia (see also Acciaioli, 1996).
Thus, in this sense, ‘Chineseness’ was constantly under the threat of erasure.
The following observation by Soenarso (1997, p. 166), a military general who served
in Suharto’s regime, reﬂects the extent of this erasure by assimilation:
If you have a foreign body in your system, you have several options, You can just ignore that
with maybe dire consequencea [sic], or you may operate and take the foreign body out, or try
to digest and absorb them [sic] into the system. We have chosen the last option.
This assertion resonates with Zygmunt Bauman’s description of the term ‘assimilation’:
it seeks to make the diﬀerent similar to oneself through ‘annihilating the strangers by
devouring them and then metabolically transforming them into a tissue indistinguish-
able from one’s own’ (Bauman, 1997, p. 47). This policy of cultural assimilation forces
the ‘foreigners’ to give up their cultural identity. The general assumption was that
identity is singular rather than plural. Hence, one could either be an Indonesian or a
Chinese. The more ‘Chineseness’ a person asserted, the less ‘Indonesian’ s/he became,
and vice versa. Hence, to be completely Indonesian, the Chinese had to give up all their
‘Chineseness’.
During this period, the Chinese were given the right to expand the nation’s economy
(and their own wealth), but, paradoxically, were marginalized and discriminated
against in all social spheres: culture, language, politics, entrance to state-owned
universities, public service and public employment (Heryanto, 1999, p. 326).7
7 For details of discrimination in the Indonesian legal system against the Chinese, based on ‘race’, see
Winarta (2004).
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This continuous and intentional oﬃcial discrimination against the Chinese placed them
in a vulnerable position of ethnic and class hostility. It also undermined the New
Order’s assimilation eﬀorts by continuously reproducing their ‘foreignness’. The
consequence of this was the May 1998 anti-Chinese riots, during which Chinese
businesses were looted and Chinese women raped in Jakarta and other parts of
Indonesia. As Jemma Purdey (2003, p. 423) noted, these riots had twin eﬀects: they
generated ‘a renewed awareness among this minority of their ethnicity and particularly
of their vulnerability in Indonesia’, as well as ‘a widely felt realization that the
assimilation project had indeed failed’.
The downfall of Suharto triggered a rise of identity politics across the whole of
Indonesian society. Multiculturalism as a policy has been contemplated and endorsed
by Indonesia’s new power holders as a preferred policy for rebuilding the nation,
consistent with Indonesia’s national motto—‘Bhinneka Tunggal Ika’ or ‘Unity in
Diversity’ (see Suryadinata, 2003). Nugroho (2002) argues that during Suharto’s era,
‘bhinneka’ (diversity) was sacriﬁced in the name of ‘ika’ (unity) through the repression
of SARA.
The Politics of Multiculturalism
Multiculturalism, a policy ﬁrst introduced in the US in the 1960s, was a signiﬁcant shift
in the ways that identity is constructed within western modernity. It signiﬁed
abandonment of both western universalism and the ideology of monocultural
assimilation (Agger, 1998). Multicultural policy generates a return to roots and leads
to a strengthening of ethnic identities (Friedman, 1997, p. 72). Agger (1998, p. 69)
describes multiculturalism as ‘the most politically engaged version of American
postmodernism’. He contends that multiculturalism espouses postmodern theories that
accentuate the notion that people’s diﬀerences are more important than their
similarities. The demand for recognition of minority rights, culture and identity—
what Charles Taylor (1994) famously refers to as a ‘politics of recognition’—is at the
core of the discourse of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism attempts to subvert cultural
homogenization by acknowledging the coexistence and equal representation of diﬀerent
cultures and peoples within a nation-state.
In any society, a certain group (or groups) will be considered ‘dominant’ through
establishing and universalizing its culture and experience as the society’s norm.
M. Khoirul Muqtafa (2004) recently noted that, in Indonesia, it will be a challenge to
implement the discourse of multiculturalism as a policy, because this paradigm faces
opposition from ‘dominant’ groups in the society, including the Muslim majority.
Religious or ethnic dominant groups tend to see multiculturalism as a threat because of
its promise to unveil the false universalism of these ‘dominant’ groups, and to give ‘voice’
to those groups which have been ‘culturally oppressed’ by being ‘both marked out by
stereotypes and at the same time rendered invisible’ (Joppke & Lukes, 1999, p. 5).
The rhetoric of multiculturalism is reﬂected in the objective of the Jakarta-based
Centre for Multicultural Understanding (RAGAM). RAGAM, a division of the Set
Foundation, is an organization that aims to ‘empower civil society through public
media’. It was ﬁrst established in 1987 but was oﬃcially recognized only in 1999 after
Suharto was ousted (see http://www.smallvoices.org/storyaryo.htm). As stated on its
website, ‘RAGAM was developed in response to Indonesia’s massive multicultural
diversity, and attempts to activate the voices of marginalized and minority groups
within the huge population’. RAGAM took initiatives to produce a television series
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aiming at educating Indonesians about diﬀerence, to ‘break down racist preconceptions
and generalizations’ (especially towards the Chinese) and to interrogate the identity not
only of the minority, ‘but also of dominant society’.
Multiculturalism seeks to give voice to oppressed minorities and aﬀords them an
identity, subjectivity and personhood by encouraging individuals within that minority
to ‘narrate’ their own experiences of oppression, which are perceived as diﬀerent from
other groups’ experiences of oppression (Agger, 1998, p. 72). In the case of post-
Suharto Indonesia, ethnic Chinese took advantage of the democratization process
brought about by ‘Reformasi’ (or Reform, used to describe the post-Suharto era) to
liberate their long-suppressed identity and cultural heritage. A consequence of this was
an ‘awakening’ or ‘resurgence’ of Chinese identity reﬂected in the formation of Chinese
political parties and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the ‘revival’ of
Chinese culture, religion, language, press and media (Hoon, 2004a, p. 13). For instance,
this new multicultural environment has provided an ideal breeding ground in which the
Chinese-language press can proliferate.
In 2004, I found 10 Chinese-language publications circulating in Jakarta. The
publication of Chinese-language media in Indonesia was encouraged by the
government because it demonstrates policy-makers’ new commitment in implementing
Reformasi. To Chinese-Indonesians, the re-emergence of Chinese-language publica-
tions has important symbolic meanings, even though most of them no longer read or
speak Chinese. The lift by President Abdurrahman Wahid on the 1978 oﬃcial ban on
Chinese printed matter signiﬁed victory over the ‘dark forces’ of Suharto’s regime and
the beginning of a bright future for the Chinese in Indonesia. Even though
competence or familiarity with the Chinese language no longer reﬂect the
‘Chineseness’ of most Chinese-Indonesians, the revival of Chinese-language publica-
tions is still perceived as an acknowledgement of the culture and identity of Chinese-
Indonesians. This shows that the post-Suharto era has been an exciting period for
identity construction and ‘speaking out’ (see Turner, 2003), as the Chinese have been
given the opportunity to express their identity after being deprived of this right for
over three decades.
Nevertheless, critics of multiculturalism argue that this policy does not necessarily
empower minority groups. In the context of social reality, multiculturalism, despite its
promises, does not necessarily redistribute power or resources. Ang (2001a, p. 14)
argues that in the ‘multicultural nation’, diﬀerences between groups are carefully
classiﬁed and organized into neat categories of distinct ‘ethnic communities’, each
classiﬁed by their own ‘culture’. The boundaries of diﬀerence and the concept of
diversity are still determined by speciﬁc hegemonic and dominant group(s) (Yuval-
Davis, 1997, p. 199).8 That is to say, no matter how tolerant Indonesian multi-
culturalism (or unity-in-diversity) might be, and how the nation is re-imagined, the
ultimate acceptance of minority groups, such as the ethnic Chinese, still largely depends
on the hegemonic group(s) or power holders.
Despite the seemingly positive signs of Chinese cultural liberalization, racial
discrimination in Indonesia is far from over. At least ﬁfty discriminative laws and
ordinances were still in force in 2002 (Anon., 2002). Just before the Chinese New Year
8 The ‘dominant’ or ‘hegemonic’ groups here refer to the non-Chinese or ‘pribumi’ majority and the
Indonesian government. Even though the non-Chinese pribumi is not a homogeneous group—as pointed
out in the beginning of this paper—owing to self-internalization and for other reasons, they often
‘imagine’ themselves as a uniﬁed collectivity when juxtaposed against the Chinese ‘Other’.
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(Imlek) celebrations in February 2002, the Chinese were warned by Jakarta’s Governor,
Sutiyoso, to celebrate the festival in a ‘low-key’ way, in order to avoid ‘jealousy’ from
society (Kompas, 8 February 2002). Sutiyoso’s comment also implies that anti-Chinese
sentiment is still present, perhaps most strongly reproduced by perceptions of racially
based inequalities of wealth. Hence, even though diversity in the form of diﬀerent
ethnicities and cultures has been tolerated on the oﬃcial level, in reality minority groups
still do not necessarily have the same rights as the dominant group(s).
Multiculturalists often represent minority cultures uncritically and simplistically as
homogeneous utopian entities. And often multiculturalism is acclaimed as a success by
simply presenting some superﬁcial and decorative aspects of certain cultural forms. As
Yiyan Wang (2000, p. 122) states,
In a society where certain cultures dominate, multiculturalism can be highly deceptive, for it
is often the case that the minority cultures become decorative of the mainstream’s tolerance
and generosity.
Even in New Order Indonesia, in spite of its assimilation rhetoric, the government put
an extraordinary eﬀort into promoting decorative aspects of their ideal version of
minority cultures by essentializing them in school curricula and textbooks and in
promoting regional arts such as traditional dance and crafts; and by displaying them
in the form of monuments such as in Taman Mini theme park. Regional diversity in
the decorative aspects of cultural forms was celebrated as evidence of the harmony
between dominant and minority cultures and the ‘success’ of managing ‘unity-in-
diversity’ (Foulcher, 1990; Acciaioli, 1996). Thus it can be seen that power holders
paid lip service to the celebration of multiculturalism and cultural diversity in order to
contain and restrain internal resistance within a political boundary. As Parker (2003,
p. 246) points out, in the New Order, ‘The emphasis was not on exploring or
understanding that diﬀerence, but on maintaining order—stabilitas [stability] and
aman [security]’.
Similarly, David Parker’s description of how homogenized Chinese culture in the
form of food provided by Chinese takeaways in Britain is hailed as contributing to a
harmonious multicultural society shows just how shallow the idea of multiculturalism
can be (Parker, 2000, p. 77). This point resonates in a speech by the then charge´ d’aﬀaires
of the Indonesian Embassy in Sydney, Imron Cotan, who was later the Ambassador to
Australia, on the occasion of the Indonesian Multicultural and Harmony Festival in
2002. He claimed, ‘Today we are once again presented with the richness of Indonesia’s
cultures through which we will be able to sample some of its ﬁnest cuisine as well as enjoy
its cultural performances presented by various ethnic groups, symbolizing the harmony
of our society’ (Cotan, 2002). This shows how multiculturalism sometimes ‘confuses
cultural diﬀerence with cultural diversity and thus naively assumes the displays of
diﬀerent cultures are the solution to cultural diﬀerence’ (Kuo, 2003, p. 230).
One other major problem with multiculturalism is that it tends to classify or
categorize people into diﬀerent homogenized and uniﬁed cultural ‘groups’ even though
individuals might not want to be identiﬁed as such. David Theo Goldberg (1994, p. 7)
maintains that, ‘Multiculturalism is celebrated in the name of a standard pluralism that
not only leaves groups constituted as givens but entrenches the boundaries ﬁxing group
demarcations as unalterable’. An example of such reiﬁcation and homogenization of
speciﬁc cultures is UNESCO’s 1993 book, The Multi-cultural Planet, in which the world
is divided into culturally homogeneous regions, and reference to ‘the European culture’,
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‘the North American culture’, ‘the Arab’ and ‘the African’, among which dialogues
should be developed (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 200). As Yuval-Davis observes:
[T]here is the inherent assumption that all members of a speciﬁc cultural collectivity are
equally committed to that culture. They tend to construct the members of minority
collectivities as basically homogeneous, speaking with a uniﬁed culture or racial voice. These
voices are constructed so as to make them as distinct as possible . . . from the majority
culture, so as to make them ‘diﬀerent’. Thus, within multiculturalism, the more traditional
and distanced from the majority culture the voice of the ‘community representatives’ is, the
more ‘authentic’ it would be perceived to be within such construction. (Yuval-Davis 1997,
p. 200)
This type of construction can be observed in popular Indonesian television serials,
known as sinetron. The over-ampliﬁcation of ethnic characteristics has always been an
obsession of Indonesian sinetron. The sinetron usually attempts to present a character as
ethnic by over-accentuating their regional accent or by making him/her wear their
regional traditional costumes. After the end of the Cold War (i.e. with the waning
threat of Communism) and, even more so, after the downfall of the New Order,
‘Chineseness’ was no longer taboo in Indonesian television programmes. I have recently
observed that ‘Chinese’ characters are increasingly appearing in a few Indonesian
sinetron. However, in showing that they were ‘Chinese’ or acting as ‘Chinese’, the actors
had to put on ‘traditional’ Chinese costume—the male with a pigtail while the female
held a silk handkerchief. These programmes deliberately use the popular stereotypes of
the Chinese, including the emphasis on ‘Chinese’ appearance—slanted eyes (mata
sipit)—and ‘Chinese’ characteristics—stingy (pelit) and money-oriented (mata duitan).
The incorporation of ‘Chineseness’ in an overly accentuated ‘traditional’ form, in a
sinetron that had a contemporary story setting, demonstrates that multiculturalism can
be not only artiﬁcial and decorative but also dangerous as it (un)wittingly perpetuates
stereotypes and essentialist demarcation between ethnic groups.
It should be stressed that the competition between identities and cultures is not
simply a competition between groups, for example pribumi and non-pribumi, but it is
also within communities and between individuals (Modood et al., 1994, p. 5).
Multiculturalism not only accounts for diﬀerences between one culture and another, but
also overlooks diversity within the same culture. This construction does not allow space
for diﬀerences of interest and power within the minority collectivity such as through
class, gender, religion, age and even culture.
The ethnic Chinese in Indonesia have never been a homogeneous ‘group’. Regional
and class diversity account partly for this heterogeneous self-identiﬁcation. ‘Chinese-
ness’ in Medan, for instance, is diﬀerent from ‘Chineseness’ in Jakarta, Kalimantan,
Bangka, Semarang, Sukabumi or Malang. Furthermore, the Chinese were stereo-
typically portrayed in Indonesia’s public sphere as economic creatures and wealthy
business people. Although this image had some truth to it, it should not be
generalized—there are many poor Chinese in Tangerang and Pontianak, for instance.
Far from being a culturally homogeneous group, the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are
very diverse and can be identiﬁed diﬀerently in diﬀerent periods and regions.
Conventionally, scholars have divided them into two main groups: the totok (China-
born newcomers, Chinese speaking) and the peranakan (local-born or mixed blood,
Indonesian speaking) (Coppel, 2002, pp. 106 – 7). The totok were mainly labourers who
arrived in the archipelago at the end of the nineteenth century; the peranakan settled in
Indonesia from the seventeenth century. The totok were themselves not a uniﬁed group,
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as they came from diﬀerent parts of China and spoke diﬀerent Chinese dialects. During
the New Order, scholars noted a general decrease in the usefulness of the totok/
peranakan distinction in identifying the Chinese owing to the forced assimilation
programme that resulted in the peranakan-ization of all Chinese (see Suryadinata, 1978,
p. 32).
Given the diverse and complex manifestations of ‘Chineseness’ represented by
regional, class, cultural and religious diﬀerence in Indonesia, the following questions
deserve to be raised: Is there a Chinese identity in Indonesia? Which ‘Chineseness’
should multiculturalism represent: for instance, the ‘Chineseness’ of Medan or Jakarta;
upper, middle or lower class; peranakan or totok; Muslim, Christian, Confucianist or
Buddhist; and primordial or hybridized?
Another question that follows from the above is who determines which
‘Chineseness’ should be represented in this multicultural model? Identity construction
and cultural representation are highly politicized processes that involve the play of
power—that is, the power to deﬁne who is included and who is excluded (Hall, 1996b,
p. 4). I have discussed above the unequal power relations within multiculturalism, as
dominant or hegemonic group(s) often solely determine which cultures are to be
included and the limits and boundaries of these cultures. However, it is also crucial to
note that the forces and power structures that inﬂuence the representation and shape
the construction of a minority culture are not necessarily external but can also be from
within the minority collectivity during self-representation. In the case of the Chinese-
Indonesian minority, leaders of resurgent Chinese organizations play an important role
in deﬁning what ‘Chineseness’ means in Indonesia. Even though in reality ‘Chineseness’
is highly contested and diverse, certain power holders within the ‘Chinese community’
who have a variety of agendas—for instance, to stress ethnic solidarity, advocate a
return to ‘roots’ and primordialism, claim authenticity and promote resinicization—can
represent it as an unchanging and static or primordial entity. When this occurs, only a
particular version of Chinese culture and ethnicity is displayed as representative of all
‘Chineseness’ within the framework of multiculturalism.
One example of such self-essentialism of ‘Chineseness’ by Chinese organizations is
the annual Cici Koko competition begun in West Jakarta in 2002. Cici Koko (the
Hokkien terms for older sister and older brother) is a contest broadcast live on
television, jointly organized by the Chinese Surnames Association (Paguyuban Sosial
Marga Tionghoa Indonesia or PSMTI) and West Jakarta Municipality. It is open to
young Jakarta-resident Chinese participants and aims to promote Chinese art and
culture and to show that Jakarta is a multiethnic city (Setiogi, 2003; Anon., 2004).9 One
of the criteria by which the contestants are judged is their knowledge of Chinese culture
and the ability to use Mandarin.10 The competitors had to wear ‘traditional’ Chinese
costumes during the contest. Winners had to wear ‘traditional’ costumes when
9 The Cici Koko contest was modelled quite closely on the Abang None (terms for older brother and sister
in local Betawi dialect) contest—the original Betawi version of the competition in Jakarta. The costumes
and selection criteria are the same for Abang None as for Cici Koko, except that the former is open to
Betawi contestants (another ethnic group prominent in Jakarta), while the latter is for Chinese.
10 The criteria of this competition were based on ﬁve areas. As well as knowledge of and ability in the
Mandarin language and Chinese culture, the remaining three were knowledge of tourism in West Jakarta
and Indonesia in general, personal etiquette, and general knowledge about society and state (Jawa Pos
Dotcom. Accessed 8 March 2004). Some winners of the Cici Koko contest acknowledged that they rarely
speak Mandarin at home, although they need to have some knowledge of the language in order to win the
contest (The Jakarta Post, 31 March 2003).
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attending public events, since they were expected to be ambassadors for the city and
also representatives of the Chinese community.
The compulsory knowledge of Chinese culture and language and the wearing of
‘traditional’ costumes implied an ideal version of ‘Chineseness’ that PSMTI wanted to
exhibit or revive, even though most young Chinese do not speak Mandarin and have
little knowledge of Chinese culture, let alone wear a version of traditional Chinese
costumes in their day-to-day lives. Projection of this homogenized, essentialized and
primordial version of ‘Chineseness’ through the powerful instrument of television
media makes it easier for the Indonesian public to assume that this is the identity of all
Chinese in Indonesia. However, as Pnina Werbner (1997b) asserts, this ‘strategic
essentializing of self-representation’ (p. 248) is a ‘rhetorical performance in which an
imagined community is invoked’ (p. 230), and which can be ‘culturally empowering’ (p.
248) for the ethnic actors.
The insistence on an essential ethnic character or the requirement of ethnic
solidarity might mean individuals are represented under an ethnic and cultural identity
that might not necessarily reﬂect their own identity. Chinese-Indonesian academic
Melani Budianta (2004, p. 606) stated, ‘For Chinese who are Chinese cultured, I am not
Chinese [enough] because I do not speak Chinese nor have any orientation to the
Chinese culture; and for those who are not Chinese cultured, I am Chinese’ [my
translation]. Peranakan Chinese of mixed ancestry and other hybridized Chinese-
Indonesians, like Budianta, who live in-between Chinese and local cultures or who
simply could not trace their historical ties to authenticated tradition, may be
disempowered by multiculturalism as they cannot ﬁnd a place within this multicultural
framework other than by re-imagining and repositioning themselves to identify with the
‘prescribed Chineseness’.
For Chua Beng Huat (2004), this is the ‘price of membership’ that individuals have
to pay in order to belong to an ascribed ethnicity. He has also observed how individuals
who do not reposition themselves to ﬁt into one of these ascribed cultural categories or
who demand the right to exit from these categories are cast as being ‘selﬁsh’ and ‘free-
riders’ within their society. However, Kelly Kuo (2003, p. 229) argues, ‘For those who
have lost their ability to enunciate their own cultural identity, multiculturalism does not
battle for cultural diﬀerence. Instead, multiculturalism displaces cultural diﬀerence in
terms of inequality of cultural identities and representations among diﬀerent groups
with homogenized cultural diversities’. This homogenization of cultures fails to give
recognition of, or ‘voice’ to, many minority groups and to potentially complex
individual identities. It also fails to acknowledge the real diversity within a nation.
Multiculturalism also tends to essentialize cultural boundaries as ﬁxed, static and
monolithic, with no space for growth and change (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 200). Racism,
according to Stuart Hall (1996a, p. 445), ‘operates by constructing impassable symbolic
boundaries between racially constituted categories . . . [so that race] constantly marks
and attempts to ﬁx and naturalize the diﬀerence between belongingness and otherness’.
It can be argued that the essentialist, ﬁxed construction of cultures as mutually
exclusive identities within multiculturalism enhances the ‘reproduction of potentially
antagonistic, dominant and subordinate others’ (Ang, 2001a, p. 14), and, hence,
provides an ideal environment in which racism can operate. The long history of
complicated mutual stereotyping and Othering between the ethnic Chinese and pribumi
in Indonesia that was founded on an essentialist discourse of impassable racial
demarcation may be perpetuated and sustained by a policy of multiculturalism if people
are ‘boxed’ and homogenized neatly into clearly boundary-deﬁned ethnic categories.
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The Politics of Hybridity
The eﬃcacy of multiculturalism as a public policy has been severely challenged by the
proliferation of diasporic and transnational connections in the cultural identiﬁcations
of migrants in this increasingly globalized late-modern world. As political and
economic borders are being re-deﬁned in the process of globalization, ‘so the borders of
the ‘‘nation’’ as both ‘‘a community of strangers’’ (Us), juxtaposed to a ‘‘strange
community’’ (Others), also become re-deﬁned’ (Anthias, 2001, p. 635). The prolifera-
tion of late-modern heterogeneity entails a disintegration of an essentialist distinction
between ﬁxed dominant group(s) and permanent minorities, partly constructed and
perpetuated by the policy of multiculturalism. As Renato Rosaldo (1989, p. 217)
comments:
In the present postcolonial world, the notion of an authentic culture as an autonomous
internally coherent universe no longer seems tenable . . . Rapidly increasing global
interdependence has made it more and more clear that neither ‘we’ nor ‘they’ are as neatly
bounded and homogeneous as once seemed to be the case. All of us inhabit an
interdependent . . . world marked by borrowing and lending across porous national and
cultural boundaries. . . .
Ang (2001a, p. 16) argues that the concept of hybridity confronts and problematizes
all these boundaries, but does not erase them, and suggests a blurring of boundaries
and, consequently, an unsettling of identities. The term ‘hybridity’ traditionally carried
the connotation of being ‘impure’, ‘racially contaminated’ and genetically ‘deviant’ in
social evolution theory. However, in the late twentieth century, ‘hybrid’ and ‘hybridity’
have been re-appropriated to signal cultural synthesis (Ifekwunigwe, 1999, p. 188). For
Goldberg (1994, p. 10), ‘Hybridities are the modalities in and through which
multicultural conditions get lived out, and renewed’. Hybridity is tied to the idea of
cultural syncretism, which foregrounds complicated cultural entanglement rather than
cultural diﬀerence partly solidiﬁed by multiculturalism (see Ang, 2001a; Anthias,
2001).
The often artiﬁcial and decorative display of cultural diversity by nation-states
treats cultures as discrete categories and suggests that there has been little interaction
between cultures.11 Multiculturalism remains as rhetoric, since it is in fact
‘monocultural’, in that it often does not allow for the recognition that an individual
member of society may have more than one ‘identity’ at work within her/himself. In the
context of multiculturalism, each individual possesses only one discrete cultural
identity. In this sense, ironically, by unwittingly setting clear boundaries and
delineations between cultures, multiculturalism has defeated its own purpose of
avoiding the monocultural nation through an assimilation policy. People who do not ﬁt
into any of those deﬁned cultural categories will be left with no choice but to
‘assimilate’ into the only oﬃcially ‘prescribed’ cultures that are available (as I note
above in Chua’s observation).
I argue that being multicultural—rather than displaying a selection of monocultural
individuals—is about the acknowledgement of the existence of a matrix of diﬀerent
11 Melani Budianta (2004, p. 603), a Chinese-Indonesian academic, wrote about her travel experience in
multiracial Malaysia where the Chinese, Malays and Indians are rigidly categorized within their racial
framework: ‘I felt as if I was in a country which was lived in by people from diﬀerent worlds who did not
see the need to interact with each other (my translation).
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cultures within each individual. Moreover, this understanding of multiculturalism at the
‘micro’ level of the individual can also be translated to the ‘macro’-societal level,
especially in the state’s accommodation of not only the existence of diﬀerent ethnic
groups, but also the diversity within each ethnic group. No wonder Homi Bhabha
(1994, p. 38) suggests that the survival of cultural diversity will be based not on ‘the
exoticism of multiculturalism or the diversity of cultures, but on the inscription and
articulation of culture’s hybridity’.
As mentioned above, the term ‘hybridity’ has an epistemological origin in pseudo-
scientiﬁc racism. Werbner (1997a) perceives the transformation of this term within a
discourse of dangerous racial contamination into one of cultural creativity as an
empowerment. In her own words, ‘Insults have been turned into strengths’ (p. 21). That
said, Ang (2001b) reminds us that some people are still not yet ready to accept this
concept, because they have been captured by the dominant essentialist ideology of
identity, nationality, ‘race’ and ethnicity. As a result, mixture is still conceived as
‘contamination, a breach of purity and infringement of ‘‘identity’’’ (Ang, 2001a, p. 200).
The emergence and proliferation of hybridity is not only an anathema but also a fear
to some governments. Arjun Guneratne (2002, p. 20) notes that even though there is no
historical validity to the concept of racial or cultural purity, the perception of cultural
purity is nevertheless an indispensable ‘precondition for the development of nationalist
sentiments’. The impurity, mixture, fusion and lack of identity that hybridity manifests
are threatening to governments, as they perceive this hybridity as a force that tends to
undermine the sovereign national identity of the nation, which is usually constructed in
terms of cultural purity and authenticity. Therefore, ‘hybridity, whether ethnic or
cultural, has to be suppressed, and becomes the site of anxiety’ (Silva, 2002, p. i).
Although often cited in postmodern literature, hybridity is by no means a new
phenomenon, nor is it a postmodern ‘invention’ (Ifekwunigwe, 1999). Nonetheless, the
process of cross-cultural ﬂows and cultural mixture has accelerated rapidly with the
proliferation of globalization in recent decades (Papastergiadis, 2005). The politics of
hybridity has been intrinsic to the process of migration and dislocation, and has been
practised by locals and migrants in their daily negotiation and construction of their
identities, consciously or unconsciously.
One aspect of the process of hybridity experienced by Chinese-Indonesians is
exempliﬁed in the language spoken by the peranakan Chinese, who have resided in
Indonesia for centuries. The peranakan intermarried with the locals and adopted local
culture. They spoke a type of hybrid language called Bahasa Melayu Tionghoa or
Chinese-Malay (also known as Batavian Malay). This language was a combination of
bazaar Malay and the Hokkien (a Chinese dialect), and later enriched by borrowings
from Dutch and other western languages (see Suryadinata, 2004, pp. 149 – 64).
Although the Chinese-Malay language is considered as ‘low Malay’, much of its
Hokkien vocabulary has become an integral part of the Indonesian language. Most of
these words are related to food, e.g. teh (tea), kecap (soy sauce), juhi (cuttleﬁsh), kue
(cakes), tahu (tofu) and soto (meat soup). These words are used by Indonesians in
everyday Indonesian language without their knowing of the words’ origins.
The lived reality of the hybrid condition of Chinese-Indonesians in contemporary
Indonesia is shown in the mixed use of language in their daily conversation. I have
noted elsewhere the hybridized Chinese-Malay language that has appeared in a post-
Suharto Indonesian-language ‘Chinese’ newspaper called ‘Sinar Glodok’ (Hoon, 2006).
Sinar Glodok is mainly circulated in the Chinatown (Glodok) area of Jakarta. An
interesting feature of Sinar Glodok that illustrates the hybridized language used by
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Chinese-Indonesians can be seen in its short-story column. The short stories are written
in Indonesian, but Hokkien and Mandarin pinyin are also used. For instance, in the
19 – 22 February 2004 issue, Mandarin pinyin was used for the title of the story (which
happened to be a Chinese proverb). Hokkien names (such as Ko A. Heng) were used to
indicate that the characters in the story were ethnic Chinese; and Chinese-Malay
expressions such as ‘Lu’ (you) and ‘Gue’ (I or me) were used in the conversational
dialogues. This type of hybrid mixture of Indonesian language, Hokkien and Chinese
terms and Chinese-Malay expressions is common in daily conversation within the
Chinese community in contemporary Indonesia.
It is crucial to note that hybridity is a continuous and often convoluted process
of cultural translation and negotiation that is never complete. For Bhabha (1994,
p. 38), the space of the ‘inter’ is the ‘cutting edge of translation and negotiation, the
‘in-between’ space’. The migrant who experiences ‘multiple rootedness and
consciousness . . . is forever mixing and mixed, forever crossing, traversing, translating
linguistically and culturally. He [sic] is not either/or, but both’ (Chan & Tong, 1995,
p. 7). This points to why assimilation remains an impossible idea: it naively treats
identity as a discrete singular entity and forces people to choose between ethnicities. In
this instance, one can be either an Indonesian or a Chinese. On the other hand, the
concept of hybridity does not suggest a submission to the impossible idea of assimi-
lation, or a retreat into an essentialized version of ‘Chineseness’ (Ang, 2001, pp. 71 – 2).
Hybridity—an accommodation of cultures and peoples at the local level—is one of the
ways to deconstruct the dichotomy between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’. The appreciation of such
hybrid identities might dissolve the rigid line between ‘Chinese’ and ‘non-Chinese’,
‘pribumi’ and ‘non-pribumi’. The breakdown of these dichotomies would help to soften
the essentialized diﬀerences associated with ‘Chineseness’ and pribumi identity.
Ernesto Laclau (cited in Hall, 2000, p. 236) states that ‘hybridization does not
necessarily mean decline through the loss of identity. It can also mean empowering
existing identities through the opening of new possibilities’. However, it is has to be
recognized that these new possibilities are not detached from the constraints of existing
boundaries. Ironically, although hybridity strives to overcome boundaries, it still
depends on them. Hence, for Papastergiadis (2005, p. 60), ‘The critical task is not to
strive for a utopian space beyond boundaries, but to re-engage the sphere of
possibilities that are permitted or excluded by boundaries’. In the case of the Chinese in
Indonesia, after a process of negotiating contradictions and the tension of maintaining
one’s own culture and becoming like others, a ‘third space’ in the form of a common,
new culture and social environment is created (see Chan & Tong, 1995, p. 9).12 This new
culture suggests the recognition of the transformative process of Chinese ethnicity into
a creative, adapted, hybridized Chinese-Indonesian identity.
Stuart Hall (2000, p. 227) notes that ‘[i]n diasporic conditions people are often
obliged to adopt shifting, multiple or hyphenated positions of identiﬁcation’. These new
identities sometimes have a transethnic and transnational character. For instance,
British Muslim identity is not restricted to an ethnic group, but is an ‘amalgam that
12 This ‘new culture’ is evident in various forms, such as the transformation of food as a result of constant
cultural exchange and borrowing. Chinese takeaways in Britain exemplify a modality of such cultural
fusion; ‘what have now become familiar forms of diﬀerence such as sweet and sour, chow mein, are in fact
not known in that form in China, but are British Chinese’ (Parker, 2000, p. 93). In Australia, the
interventions and participation of Asians have transformed Australian public culture, especially in art,
media and popular culture, as well as in everyday life.
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may be linked to fabricating identity as a mode of resistance’ (Anthias, 2001, p. 625).
However, it should be stressed that not all hyphenated identities are necessarily cultural
hybrids. In other words, an individual who claims that he/she is part-Japanese, part-
Chinese, part-Malaysian and part-Australian, does not automatically become a cultural
hybrid. Hybridity is also not a reference to the mixed racial composition of populations
(Hall, 2000, p. 226). Jonathan Friedman (1997, pp. 82 – 3) argues against the
identiﬁcation of individuals as fully formed hybrid subjects or ‘pure hybrids’, as this
claim of ‘purity’ only returns to an essentialized notion of race and/or culture. Instead,
hybrid identity formation is a continuing process of negotiations that is always in
transit, travelling between diﬀerent cultural spaces and diﬀerent identity vectors
(Munoz, 1999, p. 32).
Nevertheless, it has to be understood that hybridity does not necessarily lead to
empowerment (Anthias, 2001, p. 622). In some cases, even where individuals adopt the
cultural traits of their host society, they may still remain marginalized and Othered as
‘foreigners’. This is illustrated clearly in the Chinese-Indonesian experience especially
during the New Order (and, to some extent, even now): regardless of the extent to which
their identity was shaped by localization, they were never accepted as ‘true’ Indonesians
and were never able to shed their identity as ‘foreigners’. Since hybridization involves
multiple cultural ﬂows, the possibility of hybridity inevitably depends on the willingness
of the culturally dominant groups to abandon the automatic assumption of
universalism and to realize that one’s cultural ‘product’ or belief is not the only one
that is possible or desirable.
In emphasizing its interaction between cultures, hybridity has sometimes been
reduced simply to a ‘celebration of cultural diversity’ or the harmonious mix of cultural
diﬀerences. This ﬂawed but popular conception of hybridity is evident in, for example,
world music—deﬁned as a hybrid mixture of music from various cultures—and
Australian ‘fusion cuisine’—claimed to be based on an imagined East-meets-West
culinary union (Lo, 2000, p. 152). Hybridity, in this sense, is becoming ‘just another
marketable commodity’ (Werbner, 1997a, p. 19). Lo (2000, p. 153) refers to this version
of hybridity as ‘happy hybridity’, because it understands cross-cultural encounters as
involving little tension, conﬂict or contradiction, and assumes ethnicities to be free of all
histories and politics. However, far from being an inevitable result of cultural mixing,
hybridity can also be a highly politicized process of negotiation, interrogation and
contestation between cultures, and the process of cultural translation involves friction
and tension, ambivalence and incommensurability (Werbner, 1997a, p. 12; Lo, 2000,
p. 153; Ang 2001a, p. 200). Therefore, hybridity should not be taken as an un-
problematic means of overcoming diﬀerences in a society.
In his paper, ‘The institutionalization of hybridity’, Chan (2005) casts doubt on the
possibility of hybridity being institutionalized as a political discourse in the near future.
His reservation is based on the concern that current discussions of hybridity have not
yet taken into serious consideration the social and economic relations of power.
Moreover, he noted that ‘hegemonic racial hierarchies’ based on essentialism are still
very much sustained within current institutional practices. Arguing against the
unquestioning acceptance of hybridity as a ‘catch-all explanatory tool’, Chan (2005,
p. 2) invites us to consider the diﬃculties related to the concept of hybridity that remain
to be addressed by cultural theorists, should hybridity be institutionalized:
What exactly are the possibilities for using ‘hybridity’ to address structural inequities and
issues related to social justice? Does everyone have the same access to mobilizing hybridized
162 Chang-Yau Hoon
agency? What are the aﬀective and political investments involved in either wanting, or
refusing to accept, hyphenated hybrid identiﬁcations, especially in increasingly conservative
political climates?
It is useful to reiterate that hybridity is ‘not the solution, but alerts us to the diﬃculty of
living with diﬀerences’ (Ang, 2001a, p. 17). As Chan showed, it is still premature to
institutionalize hybridity. Perhaps hybridity is never meant to be institutionalized to
replace current political frameworks and policies. As indicated at the beginning of this
paper, hybridity is only an analytical approach, but a necessary one, for us to
conceptualize identity and diﬀerence beyond the paradigm of essentialism. It provides a
critical perspective for us to understand the ambivalence, dynamics and complexities of
identities in late modern world. With such critical perspectives, we can thus ‘reaﬃrm the
political frameworks that promote diversity over uniformity, inclusivity over
exclusivity, merit over privilege, dialogue over dogma’ (Papastergiadis, 2005, p. 57).
In this paper, I have argued that the insistence of multiculturalism on enunciating
culture as ﬁxed and unchanging has rendered this policy a challenging practice.
Multiculturalism that over-emphasizes cultural boundedness has the drawback of
becoming a frame for hiding racism under the veil of ‘cultural diﬀerence’. Ironically,
this is an eﬀect that the very policy was set up to erase. Perhaps the real problem of
multiculturalism lies in ‘that the ‘‘-ism’’ tends to convert ‘‘multiculturalism’’ into a
political doctrine’ (Hall, 2000, p. 210). Multicultural conditions can only be lived out,
regenerated and transformed with the recognition of hybridity. Nonetheless, the
concept of hybridity is not immune to political abuse and has sometimes been
(mis)represented as a discourse of simple multicultural harmony. Ang (2001a, p. 17)
reminds us that ‘hybridity, the very condition of in-betweenness, can never be a
question of simple shaking hands, of happy, harmonious merger and fusion’.
The process of democratization has given rise to a proliferation of identity politics
in post-Suharto Indonesia. At the same time, this politicization has challenged the
nation to seek new approach(es) to accommodating its diverse ethnic groups. The
important question now for Indonesia is not so much how to ‘overcome’ and ‘get rid’ of
diﬀerence, as was the case with its assimilationist policy, but rather how to ‘live with’
diﬀerence (Ang, 2001a, p. 194; Papastergiadis, 2005, p. 60). In formulating a
multicultural policy to replace the old assimilationist paradigm in Indonesia, it is
imperative for policy-makers to recognize cross-cultural mixing, borrowing and
hybridization that takes place in day-to-day reality so that ethnic diﬀerences can be
accommodated more successfully in this diverse nation.
Acknowledgements
I thank Dr Lyn Parker and Dr Romit Dasgupta at Asian Studies in the University of
Western Australia, for their generous suggestions and advice on my earlier draft of this
article.
References
Acciaioli, G. (1996) Pavillions and posters: showcasing diversity and development in contemporary Indonesia,
Elkon, 1, pp. 27 – 42.
Agger, B. (1998) Critical social theories: an introduction (Oxford, Westview Press).
Aguilar, F.V. Jr (2001) Citizenship, inheritance, and the indigenizing of ‘Orang Chinese’ in Indonesia,
Positions, 9(3), pp. 501 – 533.
Assimilation, Multiculturalism, Hybridity 163
Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined communities: reﬂections of the origin and spread of nationalism (London, Verso).
Ang, I. (2001a)On not speaking Chinese: living between Asia and the west (London and New York, Routledge).
Ang, I. (2001b) Trapped in ambivalence: Chinese Indonesians, victimhood, and the debris of history.
In M. Morris and B. de Bary (Eds) ‘Race’ panic and the memory of migration, traces 2 (Hong Kong, Hong
Kong University Press), pp. 21 – 47.
Anon (2002) Mega urged to do more to end discrimination, The Jakarta Post Online. Available at http://
www.thejakartapost.com (accessed 19 February 2002).
Anon (2004) Koko Cici Dapat Voucher Rp. 25.000 [Koko Cici received vouchers of 25,000 rupiah], in Jawa Pos
Dotcom, 8 March. Available at http://www.jawapos.co.id/ (accessed 15 March 2004).
Anthias, F. (2001) New hybridities, old concepts: the limits of ‘culture, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 24(4),
pp. 619 – 641.
Bauman, Z. (1997) The making and unmaking of strangers. In P. Werbner and T. Modood (Eds)
Debating cultural hybridity: multi-cultural identities and the politics of anti-racism (London, Zed Books),
pp. 46 – 57.
Bhabha, H.K. (1994) The location of culture (London, Routledge).
Budianta, M. (2004) Identitas dalam masyarakat multibudaya [Identity in multicultural society].
In H. Soesastro, J. Kristiadi and A. Priyadi (Eds) Budi dan Nalar: 70 Tahun Harry Tjan Silalahi
[Knowledge and thoughts: 70 year old Harry Tjan Silalahi] (Jakarta, Centre for Strategic and International
Studies), pp. 601 – 612.
Burhanuddin (2003) Mencari Akar Kultural Civil Society di Indonesia [Searching for the cultural roots of civil
society in Indonesia] (Ciputat, Indonesian Institute for Civil Society).
Chan, D. (2005) The Institutionalisation of hybridity. In T. Khoo (Ed.) The body politic: racialized political
cultures in Australia (Refereed Proceedings from the UQ Australian Studies Centre Conference, Brisbane,
24 – 26 November 2004) (Brisbane and Melbourne, University of Queensland’s Australian Studies Centre
and Monash University’s National Centre for Australian Studies). [http://www.asc.uq.edu.au/bodypolitic/
chan.pdf] (accessed 20 October 2005).
Chan, K.B. and Tong, C.K. (1995) Modelling culture contact and Chinese ethnicity in Thailand, Southeast
Asian Journal of Social Science, 23(1), pp. 1 – 12.
Chua, B.H. (2004) Multiculturalism and community exChanges in Southeast Asia. In G. Pass and D. Woods
(Eds) Alchemies: Community exChanges (Perth, Black Swan Press), pp. 359 – 371.
Coppel, C. (1983) Indonesian Chinese in crisis (Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press).
Coppel, C. (2002) Studying ethnic Chinese in Indonesia (Singapore, Singapore Society of Asian Studies).
Cotan, I. (2002) Speech for Indonesian multicultural and harmony festival, Sydney. Available at http://
www.kbri-canberra.org/speeches/2002/0907sydv.htm (accessed 5 March 2004).
Danusiri, A. and Alhaziri, W. (eds) (2002) Pendidikan Memang Multikultural: Beberapa Gagasan [Education is
multicultural: several ideas] (Jakarta, Ragam Centre for Multicultural Understanding and Sains Estetika
dan Teknologi).
Elson, R.E. (2001) Suharto: a political biography (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
Foulcher, K. (1990) The construction of an Indonesian national culture: patterns of hegemony and resistance.
In A. Budiman (Ed.) State and civil society in Indonesia (Melbourne, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia
No. 22), pp. 301 – 320.
Friedman, J. (1997) Global crises, the struggle for cultural identity and intellectual porkbarreling:
cosmopolitans versus locals, ethnics and nationals in an era of de-hegemonisation. In P. Werbner and
T. Modood (Eds) Debating cultural hybridity: multi-cultural identities and the politics of anti-racism
(London, Zed Books), pp. 70 – 89.
Goldberg, D.T. (1994) Introduction: multicultural conditions. In D.T. Goldberg (Ed.) Multiculturalism: a
critical reader (Oxford, Blackwell), pp. 1 – 44.
Guneratne, A. (2002) What’s in a name? Aryans and Dravidians in the making of Sri Lankan identities.
In N. Silva (Ed.) The hybrid island: culture crossings and the invention of identity in Sri Lanka (Colombo,
Social Scientists’ Association), pp. 20 – 40.
Hall, S. (1992) The Question of cultural identity. In S. Hall, D. Held and A. McGrew (Eds)Modernity and its
futures (Cambridge, Polity Press), pp. 273 – 326.
Hall, S. (1996a) New ethnicities. In D. Morley and K.-H. Chen (Eds) Stuart Hall: critical dialogues in cultural
studies (London and New York, Routledge), pp. 441 – 449.
Hall, S. (1996b) Who needs an identity? In S. Hall and P. du Gay (Eds) Questions of cultural identity (London,
Sage), pp. 1 – 17.
Hall, S. (2000) Conclusion: the multi-cultural question. In B. Hesse (Ed.) Un/settled multiculturalisms:
diasporas, entanglements, transruptions (London, Zed Books), pp. 209 – 241.
164 Chang-Yau Hoon
Heryanto, A. (1998) Ethnic identities and erasure: Chinese Indonesians in public culture. In J.S. Kahn (Ed.)
Southeast Asian identities (Singapore and London: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), pp. 95 – 114.
Heryanto, A. (1999) Rape, race and reporting. In A. Budiman, B. Hatley and D. Kingsbury (Eds) Reformasi:
crisis and change in Indonesia (Clayton, Monash Asia Institute), pp. 299 – 334.
Hoon, C.-Y. (2004a) How to be Chinese: ethnic Chinese experience a ‘reawakening’ of their Chinese identity,
Inside Indonesia, 78(April – June), pp. 13 – 14.
Hoon, C.-Y. (2004b) Multiculturalism and hybridity in accommodating ‘Chineseness’ in post-Suharto
Indonesia. In G. Pass and D. Woods (Eds) Alchemies: community exChanges (Perth, Black Swan Press),
pp. 17 – 37.
Hoon, C.-Y. (2006) A hundred ﬂowers bloom: the re-emergence of the Chinese press in post Suharto
Indonesia. In W. Sun (Ed.) Media and Chinese diaspora: community, communication and commerce
(Routledge Curzon).
Ifekwunigwe, J.O. (1999) Old whine, new vassals: are diaspora and hybridity postmodern inventions?
In P. Cohen (Ed.) New ethnicities, old racisms? (London, Zed Books), pp. 180 – 204.
Joppke, C. and Lukes, S. (1999) Introduction: multicultural questions. In C. Joppke and S. Lukes (Eds)
Multicultural Questions (Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 1 – 26.
Kuo, K.C.-H. (2003) A euphoria of transcultural hybridity: is multiculturalism possible? Postcolonial Studies,
6(2), pp. 223 – 235.
Lloyd, G.J. (2001) Chinese Indonesians: unsettled past, uncertain future. In M.R. Godley and G.J. Lloyd
(Eds) Perspectives on the Chinese Indonesians (Adelaide, Crawford House), pp. 1 – 19.
Lo, J. (2000) Beyond happy hybridity: performing Asian-Australians identities. In I. Ang et al. (Eds) Alter/
Asians: Asian-Australian identities in art, media and popular culture (Sydney, Pluto Press), pp. 152 – 168.
Mackie, J. (2005) How many Chinese Indonesians, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 41(1), pp. 97 – 101.
‘Mega urged to do more to end discrimination’, The Jakarta Post Online. Available online at http://
www.thejakartapost.com) (accessed 19 February 2002).
Modood, T., Beishon, S. and Virdee, S. (1994) Changing ethnic identities (London, Policy Studies Institute).
Morﬁt, M. (1986) Pancasila orthodoxy. In C. MacAndrews (Ed.) Central government and local government in
Indonesia (Oxford, Oxford University Press), pp. 42 – 55.
Multicultural Media. Available online at http://www.smallvoices.org/storyaryo.htm
Munoz, J.E. (1999) Disidentiﬁcations: queers of color and the performance of politics. In G. Yudice,
J. Franco and J. Flores (Eds) Cultural studies of the Americas, Vol. 2 (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota
Press).
Muqtafa, M.K. (2004) Paradigma multikultural [The multicultural paradigm], Harian Sinar Harapan,
5 February.
Nugroho, G. (2002) Kata pengantar [Introduction]. In A. Danusiri and W. Alhaziri (Eds) Pendidikan
Memang Multikultural: Beberapa Gagasan [Education is multicultural: several ideas] (Jakarta, Ragam Centre
for Multicultural Understanding and Sains Estetika dan Teknologi), pp. vii – ix.
Papastergiadis, N. (2005) Hybridity and ambivalence: places and ﬂows in contemporary art and culture,
Theory, Culture and Society, 22(4), pp. 39 – 64.
Parker, D. (2000) The Chinese takeaway and the diasporic habitus: space, time and power geometries.
In B. Hesse (Ed.) Un/settled multiculturalisms: diasporas, entanglements, transruptions (London, Zed
Books), pp. 73 – 95.
Parker, L. (2003) From subjects to citizens: Balinese villagers in the Indonesian nation-state (Copenhagen,
Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press).
Pass, G. and Woods, D. (eds) (2004) Multiculturalism and hybridity in accommodating ‘‘Chineseness’’ in
post-Suharto Indonesia. In Alchemies: community exChanges (Perth, Black Swan Press), pp. 17 – 38.
‘Perayaan Imlek diminta dilakukan secara sederhana’ [It was advised that Chinese new year be celebrated in
low key], Kompas, 8 February.
Purdey, J. (2003) Reopening the asimilasi vs integrasi debate: ethnic Chinese identity in post-Suharto
Indonesia, Asian Ethnicity, 4(3), pp. 421 – 437.
Rosaldo, R. (1989) Culture and truth: the remaking of social analysis (Boston, Beacon Press).
Rosaldo, R. (2003) The borders of belonging: nation and citizen in the hinterlands. In R. Rosaldo (Ed.)
Cultural citizenship in Island Southeast Asia: nation and belonging in the hinterlands (Berkeley, University of
California Press), pp. 1 – 15.
Setiogi, S.P. (2003) Freddy, Caroline elected as ‘Koko’ and ‘Cici’ 2003, The Jakarta Post Online. Available
online at http://www.thejakartapost.com (accessed 31 March 2004).
Silva, N. (2002) Introduction: the hybrid island. In N. Silva (Ed.) The hybrid island: culture crossings and the
invention of identity in Sri Lanka (Colombo, Social Scientists’ Association), pp. i – vii.
Assimilation, Multiculturalism, Hybridity 165
Soenarso (1997) Pembauran perlu interaksi intensif [Assimilation needs intensive interaction].
In R.D. Wahono (Ed.) 70 Tahun Junus Jahya: Pribumi Kuat Kunci Pembauran [70 Years Junus Jahya:
Strong Pribumi, the key is to assimilate] (Jakarta, Bina Rena Pariwara), pp. 166 – 171.
Suparlan, P. (2003) Kesukubangsaan dan posisi orang Cina dalam masyarakat majemuk Indonesia [Ethnicity
and Chinese position in Indonesia’s diverse society], Jurnal Antropologi Indonesia, XXVII(71), pp. 23 – 33.
Suryadinata, L. (1978) The Chinese minority in Indonesia: seven papers (Singapore, Chopmen Enterprises).
Suryadinata, L. (2003) Kebijakan negara Indonesia terhadap etnik Tionghoa: Dari asimilasi ke multi-
kulturalisme? [Indonesian state policy towards ethnic Chinese: from assimilation to multiculturalism?],
Jurnal Antropologi Indonesia, XXVII(71), pp. 1 – 12.
Suryadinata, L. (2004) The culture of the Chinese minority in Indonesia (Singapore, Marshall Cavendish
Academic).
Suryadinata, L., Ariﬁn, E.N. and Ananta, A. (2003) Indonesia’s Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a
Changing Political Landscape (Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies).
Taylor, C. (1994) The politics of recognition. In D.T. Goldberg (Ed.) Multiculturalism: a critical reader
(Oxford, Blackwell), pp. 75 – 106.
Thung, J.L. (1998) Identities in ﬂux: young Chinese in Jakarta. unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, La Trobe
University, Bundoora.
Thung, J.L. (2004) Ethnicity and the civil rights movement in Indonesia. In L.H. Guan (Ed.) Civil society in
Southeast Asia (Singapore, ISEAS Publications and Copenhagen, NIAS Press), pp. 217 – 233.
Turner, S. (2003) Speaking out: Chinese Indonesians after Suharto. Asian Ethnicity, 4(3), pp. 337 – 351.
Wang, Y. (2000) Settlers and sojourners: multicultural subjectivity of Chinese-Australian artists. In I. Ang,
S. Chalmers, L. Law and M. Thomas (Eds) Alter/Asians: Asian-Australian identities in art, media and
popular culture (Sydney, Pluto Press), pp. 107 – 122.
Werbner, P. (1997a) Introduction: the dialectics of cultural hybridity. In P. Werbner and T. Modood (Eds)
Debating cultural hybridity: multi-cultural identities and the politics of anti-racism (London, Zed Books),
pp. 1 – 26.
Werbner, P. (1997b) Essentialising essentialism, essentialising silence: ambivalence and multiplicity in the
construction of racism and ethnicity. In P. Werbner and T. Modood (Eds) Debating cultural hybridity:
multi-cultural identities and the politics of anti-racism (London, Zed Books), pp. 226 – 255.
Winarta, F.H. (2004) Racial discrimination in the Indonesian legal system: ethnic Chinese and nation-
building. In L. Suryadinata (Ed.) Ethnic relations and nation-building in Southeast Asia (Singapore,
Singapore Society of Asian Studies and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), pp. 66 – 81.
Yuval-Davis, N. (1997) Ethnicity, gender relations and multiculturalism. In P. Werbner and T. Modood (Eds)
Debating cultural hybridity: multicultural identities and the politics of anti-racism (London, Zed Books),
pp. 193 – 207.
166 Chang-Yau Hoon
